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ABSTRACT: Drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and
even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to
date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large.
This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the
resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space,
and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning.
Overall, the article offers insights into how this important emerging technology
fits into the broader defense ecosystem and outlines practical approaches to
strengthening related information warfare capabilities.

Keywords: information warfare, drone swarms, unmanned systems,
cyberwarfare, electronic warfare

D

rone swarms are here.1 In Israel’s 2021 conflict with Gaza, the country’s
military became the first to deploy a drone swarm in combat. During
the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia deployed the
Kalashnikov KUB-BLA loitering munition, which reportedly is (or will be) capable
of swarming.2 Russia also possesses a yet-to-be-deployed Lancet-3 munition with the
potential capability to create aerial minefields to target drones and other aircraft.
The United States and its allies and adversaries are pursuing collaborative
drone-swarm technology. This pursuit is no surprise. Drone swarms have applications
for every military service across every area of conflict, from infantry support
and logistics to nuclear deterrence.3 Military leaders across the Joint force must
consider how drone swarms relate to existing capabilities and forms of warfare as
the technology matures and enters the battlefield. These ideas should inform future
concepts, acquisition decisions, exercises, training, plans, and operations to account
for friendly and adversarial use. This article examines one aspect of a larger challenge:
drone swarms and information warfare.
1. Sebastien Roblin, “Russian Drone Swarm Technology Promises Aerial Minefield Capabilities,”
National Interest (website), December 30, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/russian-drone-swarm
-technology-promises-aerial-minefield-capabilities-198640.
2. “ZALA Aero Company Successfully Tests KUB-BLA Kamikaze Drone,” Air Recognition (website),
November 12, 2021, https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/news/defense-aviation-news/2021/november
/7857-zala-aero-company-successfully-tests-kub-bla-kamikaze-drone.html; and Will Knight, “Russia’s Killer
Drone in Ukraine Raises Fears about AI in Warfare,” Wired (website), March 17, 2022, https://www.wired.com
/story/ai-drones-russia-ukraine/.
3. Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Swarming Destruction: Drone Swarms and Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 5-6 (2019): 523–43.
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Although drone swarms may operate on land, at sea, in the air, and even in
space, they are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. The common
denominator of every swarm is the need to maintain stable communication links
between drones and ensure information is processed efficiently and appropriately.
Indeed, swarms are “multiple unmanned systems capable of coordinating their
actions to accomplish shared objectives.”4 Many of the unique strengths of
swarming also derive from information sharing.
The advantages of drone swarms stem from three key areas: swarm size,
customization, and diversity.5 Each area depends on effective information
management. Larger swarms with more sensors and munitions are more capable
and can enable mass attacks; however, the swarm must handle inputs from more
drones. Flexible swarms add or remove drones to meet commander needs, may
break into smaller groups to attack from multiple directions or strike different
targets, and handle changes to information inputs as drones are added or removed.
Diverse swarms can incorporate different types of munitions and sensors and allow
closely integrated, multidomain strikes, add new types of information sources, and
create coordination challenges when the drones move at different speeds with
different environmental risks. Information failure means risk of collision and loss
of capability.
These capabilities enable novel tactics supported by information sharing.
As Paul Scharre writes, “Swarming will be a more effective, dynamic, and
responsive organizational paradigm for combat.”6 Swarms can concentrate fire
on targets or disperse and reform to counterattack. Achieving these feats requires
high levels of stable communication.7
Support technologies depend on information as well. Machine vision—the
ability of machines to see—requires a high volume of data to train the algorithms.
Sensor drones use these algorithms to collect and share information on adversarial
defenses, possible targets, and environmental hazards.8 Like individual drones, the
swarm as a whole or the external control systems must process the high volume of
information collected in the field. Processing speeds affect the swarm’s battlefield
value because slower algorithm speeds mean slower decision making.9 Although
4. Kallenborn and Bleek, “Swarming Destruction.”
5. Zachary Kallenborn, “The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We Need to Be Ready for It,”
Modern War Institute at West Point (website), October 25, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm
-coming-need-ready/.
6. Paul Scharre, “How Swarming Will Change Warfare,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (website),
October 22, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/how-swarming-will-change-warfare/.
7. Scharre, “Swarming Will Change Warfare.”
8. Zachary Kallenborn, “Swarm Talk: Understanding Drone Typology,” Modern War Institute at West
Point (website), December 10, 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/swarm-talk-understanding-drone-typology/.
9. Paul Scharre, “Counter-Swarm: A Guide to Defeating Robotic Swarms,” War on the Rocks (website),
March 31, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/counter-swarm-a-guide-to-defeating-robotic-swarms/.
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a swarm may not incorporate machine vision, human controllers will face similar
challenges as the swarm scales in size.
Information dependence means drone swarms must be considered in the
context of information warfare. According to the Congressional Research Service,
the US government does not have an official definition for information warfare.
Practitioners typically define information warfare as “strategy for the use and
management of information to pursue a competitive advantage, including both
offensive and defensive operations.”10 This strategy includes electronic warfare,
elements of cyberwarfare, and psychological warfare. Space warfare is included
here because position, navigation, timing information, and satellite-based
communication are critical information sources for unmanned systems.11
Of course, noting the information dependence does not mean actors will
successfully recognize or exploit this dependency. Although the Russian military
has long recognized the importance of electronic warfare in countering drones,
the military appears to have struggled in implementing this knowledge during
the Ukraine conflict. For example, video released on social media seems to
show Ukrainian drones in close proximity to Russian vehicles with no Russian
electronic-warfare protection.12 The Russian military and others may also
struggle to implement this knowledge in the cyber, space, and psychological
warfare domains.
This article examines the relationship of drone swarms to the four dimensions
of information warfare (electronic, cyber, space, and psychological) and explores
artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, which support the other areas and affect
drone-swarm information-warfare vulnerabilities. Policy recommendations
conclude the article.

Electronic Warfare
In the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College’s review of
counterdrone systems, electronic jamming was the most popular counterdrone
interdiction system.13 This popularity is no surprise; electronic jamming represents
a potentially cheap, reusable approach to defeating drones, swarming or not.
Humans must provide drones with mission parameters, firing decisions, and,
sometimes, physical control. Interrupting control and information sharing within
10. Catherine A. Theohary, Defense Primer: Information Operations, IF10771 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, December 2020).
11. Theohary, Defense Primer.
12. Samuel Bendett (@SamBendett), “If these are indeed Ukrainian drones in such a close proximity to
Russian vehicles, where is the Russian counter-UAV and EW protection?,” Twitter, March 19, 2022, 8:54 AM,
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1505165776814288897.
13. Arthur Holland Michel, Counter-Drone Systems (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Center for the Study of
the Drone, February 2018).
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the swarm disrupts the drones. If communication is disrupted, humans cannot
set or revise the mission or direct strikes or issue retreat orders. Drone swarms
depend even more on communication—particularly, communication on the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Although drones can create swarms according to simple rules, communication is
essential for complex behaviors, particularly for swarming in a military context in
which battlefields have varied terrain, combatant numbers and configurations shift,
and a range of combat tactics are employed.14 Thus, communication is necessary to
prevent drone-swarm collision and coordinate movements and attack decisions.
If the drones cannot communicate, the swarm cannot function as a coherent unit,
coordinate searches for targets, or share successful identifications. In addition,
the drones cannot coordinate strikes in which some drones attack one target and
others another. The value of a drone swarm is lost without communication.
Electronic attacks can mimic friendly signals and manipulate the
communication of the whole swarm. For instance, Iran reportedly captured a
Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel drone by jamming the drone’s communication
and manipulating the Global Positioning System to force it to land in Iran
in 2011.15 False signals could steer an aerial swarm into a mountain, building, or
other obstacle. If a state allows drones to fire without human control (which is by
no means certain), adversaries could also send a signal indicating an adversary is at
a friendly position, potentially causing the swarm to fire on the position.
The communication architecture—and, therefore, the methods of disrupting
or manipulating the drone swarm—vary among different swarms.16 Swarm
communication typically relies on the electromagnetic spectrum—radio waves
(for example, Wi-Fi), infrared, and optical—but acoustic signals are likely
necessary for underwater drones because electromagnetic signals do not propagate
well underwater.17 Thus, spectrum management is important to ensure signals
within and among the swarm and any control station are deconflicted. The swarm
control architecture requires signal delivery to the correct drone, which presents a
challenge if drones in the swarm are disabled or destroyed.

14. Maaike Verbruggen, The Question of Swarms Control: Challenges to Ensuring Human Control over Military
Systems, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 65 (Brussels: EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Consortium, 2019).
15. Scott Peterson, “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says Iranian Engineer,” Christian Science Monitor
(website), December 15, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran
-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer.
16. Xi Chen, Jun Tang, and Songyang Lao, “Review of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarm Communication
Architectures and Routing Protocols,” Applied Sciences 10, no. 10 (2020).
17. John Heidemann, Milica Stojanovic, and Michele Zorzi, “Underwater Sensor Networks: Applications,
Advances, and Challenges,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engineering Sciences 370, no. 1,958 (2012): 158–75.
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How information propagates throughout the swarm may vary, too, which
may affect the mechanics of disrupting or maintaining communication.18
In a swarm with centralized control, a single leader may coordinate tasks
assigned to each member of the swarm. In swarms with decentralized control,
drones communicate with the drones nearest them, leading to emergent flocking
behaviors. In theory, this action removes the need for global communication.
But the simple algorithms that enable decentralized control may be insufficient
for complex, dynamic military contexts.
Future developments may reduce swarm electromagnetic spectrum dependence.
New technologies offer communication channels according to different physical
principles, such as quantum communication.19 Alternatively, drones could
coordinate their actions indirectly through stigmergy.20 Insects such as ants leave
pheromone traces on potential food sources. The ants that follow hone in on the
traces and leave their pheromones if they, too, find food. Advanced drone swarms
could adopt similar methods.
Ants offer another lesson for drone swarms: diversity in roles. Ants in a
colony adopt specialized roles, most obviously between queen and worker ants.
Likewise, swarms may incorporate communication drones that dedicate available
onboard power to strengthening signals, serve as alternate nodes to exchange
communication, or use a different signal type to issue retreat orders. Drone
swarms could also blend centralized and decentralized communication approaches
to increase resiliency. For example, the swarm may rely on decentralized
communication and have a backup centralized communication system to combat
jamming. This approach would require significant technical development to
prevent conflict between the two communication approaches.
As drone swarms grow more autonomous, less information from
electromagnetic spectrum-based sources originating outside the swarm is
necessary, and less need for human input means less need for some communication
channels. This autonomy, however, comes with a trade-off in new opportunities to
manipulate or disrupt the autonomous systems.
In theory, an advanced drone swarm could become independent from external
control, but policy and technical challenges place an upper bound on autonomy.
Current Department of Defense policy does not allow semiautonomous weapons
aboard unmanned platforms to select and engage targets if communications are
18. Verbruggen, Swarms Control.
19. Martin Giles, “Explainer: What Is Quantum Communication?,” MIT Technology Review (website),
February 14, 2019, www.technologyreview.com/s/612964/what-is-quantum-communications/.
20. Ralph Beckers, Owen E. Holland, and Jean-Louis Deneubourg, “From Local Actions to Global Tasks:
Stigmergy and Collective Robotics,” in Prerational Intelligence: Adaptive Behavior and Intelligent Systems
without Symbols and Logic, ed. Holk Cruise, Jeffrey Dean, and Helge Ritter (Dordrecht, NL: Springer Science,
2000), 2:1008–22.

92

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

degraded, nor can autonomous weapons target human beings with lethal force
without meaningful human input.21 Popular resistance will likely constrain change
because people already fear robots gone wild. Autonomous, complex strategic
decisions such as assessing the value of a target to an overall war effort are likely
to be impossible without generalized AI, which is unlikely to emerge in the near
term, if ever. So, some electronic communication will be needed for the foreseeable
future. Electronic warfare is also increasingly tied to cyberwarfare.

Cyberwarfare
Cyberattacks may seek to disable, control, manipulate, or exfiltrate
information from drone swarms. Swarms necessarily possess all the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities of individual drones, including vulnerability to deauthentication
attacks (preventing the controller from operating the drone), code injection,
and code alteration, exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, and exfiltration of
data.22 The incorporation of swarming introduces the interception, manipulation,
and disruption of interswarm communication and the algorithms that manage
collective swarm behavior, thereby broadening the attack surface. More drones
also means more opportunities to attack the system.
Cyberattacks could drone control systems through deauthentication attacks or
code injections or alterations. Disabling human control or code alterations that
immobilize drone engines or propellers may cause the swarm to crash. Falling
drones could collide with other drones or other friendly assets. Disabling sensors
could cause the drone swarm to fly blindly, resulting in collisions or preventing
the identification of adversary defenses and other targets of interest. As a civilian
example, researchers in July 2015 exploited cyber vulnerabilities to disable the
brakes on a Jeep Cherokee®.23 Limiting drone movement provides adversaries
with a battlefield advantage. More subtly, cyberattacks may exploit drone-swarm
information processing algorithms. Simple manipulations of drone control and
task allocation algorithms achieved through the provision of incorrect data, replay
attacks (repeating or delaying valid information transfers), injections of nefarious
code, or the alteration of existing code could cause significant disruptions. If a
manipulation prevents drones from detecting one another, they may collide.
A failure to detect an environmental hazard may cause a crash by simply
feeding old video or image data so the swarm does not “see” the building in
front of it. Because errors are inevitable, code alterations that increase the risk of
21. Ashton B. Carter, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, Department of Defense Directive 3000.09
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 2012).
22. C. G. Leela Krishna and Robin R. Murphy, “A Review of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” in 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Safety, Security, and Rescue Robotics
(SSRR) (New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2017).
23. Mahmoud Hashem Eiza and Qiang Ni, “Driving with Sharks: Rethinking Connected Vehicles with
Vehicle Cyber Security,” IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine 12, no. 2 (June 2017).
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error (but that do not necessarily cause one) may go undetected for a long
time. An adversary-induced error may appear as a normal computer error.24
Alternatively, cyber manipulations may slow information processing, decision
making, or object recognition and make the swarm more vulnerable to
counterswarm defenses. Algorithm sabotage could even occur during the
production process.
Advances in machine learning and related technologies allow adversaries to
create and disseminate highly sophisticated fake images and videos or use cyber
infiltration to inject them into data collections.25 Fake data may lead image
and video analysis software to incorrect conclusions, missed threats, or
noncombatant targeting. If the same software is used in multiple unmanned
systems, adversaries could cause massive harm.
Most significantly, adversaries could redirect the drone swarm to attack friendly
targets through code alteration to the control algorithm or feeding incorrect
data so the swarm believes a friendly target is an adversary.26 Adversaries would
turn the swarms’ capabilities to their gain. Alternatively, adversaries could order
the swarm to leave a threatened area or move into adversarial fire. Adversaries
might also render the swarm safe for collection and study to gain unique
intelligence on the swarm’s capabilities. Vulnerability to cyber manipulation and
levels of autonomy are interrelated.
More autonomy means more complex computing systems with more
opportunities for exploitation and greater risk of error. Drones with autonomous
navigation, movement, or targeting systems can operate without human control
and can be manipulated. Likewise, coordination is likely to be more difficult
with larger, heterogeneous swarms, which raises the risk of catastrophic failure.
Identifying infiltration is also more challenging with larger swarms because
adversaries may attack only one drone within the swarm.
Finally, adversaries could seek to exfiltrate data from the swarm by accessing
communication links between the drones or between the drones and the control
station or software and firmware in the internal control system of the drones
themselves. These tactics could allow adversaries to collect intelligence on the
location and activity of the swarm to improve defenses, retreat from an anticipated
attack area, or prepare countermeasures as appropriate. Data exfiltration may
24. Duffel Blog reporters 29 Reasons Why and Veishnoriets, “Point/Counterpoint: Future Wars Will
Be Fought with AI Robots vs. ‘Microsoft Word Is Not Responding,’ ” Duffel Blog, May 30, 2019,
www.duffelblog.com / 2019 / 05 / point- counterpoint -future- wars-will-be-fought -with-ai -robots -vs-microsoft
-word-is-not-responding/.
25. Patrick Tucker, “The Newest AI-Enabled Weapon: ‘Deep-Faking’ Photos of the Earth,” Defense One
(website), March 31, 2019, www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/03/next-phase-ai-deep-faking-whole
-world-and-china-ahead/155944/?oref=d-topstory.
26. Scharre, “Counter-Swarm.”
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also enable more disruptive operations through a better understanding of the
algorithms and programs that enable multiple drones to operate as swarms.
This understanding would also better enable actors to create their own swarms.

Space Warfare
Drone swarms typically rely on space assets for geolocation, and swarms that
operate over the horizon require space assets for command and control. If satellites
are disabled or destroyed, the swarms may not operate effectively—or at all. Recent
technological developments, however, suggest the space domain may be less of a
dependency over time and the most likely dimension of information warfare to
stop being a drone-swarm requirement.
Many drone swarms rely on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
to guide them, and GNSS waypoints can be used to define the paths followed or
the areas to avoid, identify targets of interest (such as the location of adversarial
installations for intelligence collection), and y guide the swarm back to launch
positions. Satellites may also serve as relays for command-and-control information.
Currently, drone swarms operate at relatively short ranges at which satellite
communication is unnecessary. As the technology evolves, swarms may operate
at longer ranges and these greater distances will likely require satellite-based
communication for updating mission objectives, giving permissions, or providing
other commands. In the future, communication among drones in a swarm may
even require space assets to cover long distances.
Disabling or destroying satellites would prevent swarms reliant on satellites
for geolocation or command orders from operating effectively. The drones would
become ineffective and start wandering without knowing what to do or where
to go. In a world where adversarial military force depends largely on unmanned
systems, disabling geolocation over a wide area could prove devastating.
Advances in technology may reduce or possibly mitigate space-based risks.
Swarms could use external GNSS nodes to aid in localization. One research
team used Global Positioning System-linked buoys to allow underwater
drones to locate their positions without direct access to the system.27 The buoys
released a periodic signal that underwater drones sensed to infer their location.
A similar concept could aid ground or aerial vehicle geolocation by using signals
transmitted from a known location (such as a support vehicle). Alternatively,
new navigation concepts may remove the need for GNSS, though the degree
27. Jules S. Jaffe et al., “A Swarm of Autonomous Miniature Underwater Robot Drifters for Exploring
Submesoscale Ocean Dynamics,” Nature Communications 8, no. 1 (January 2017).
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to which these concepts will be successful in a military context is unclear.28 As
with electronic warfare, greater drone autonomy lowers the need for external,
space-based signals.

Psychological Warfare
Drone swarms have the least relevance for psychological warfare. The exception
is for possibly spreading propaganda pamphlets, however, swarms appear
to have few, if any, meaningful advantages over existing means of spreading
propaganda. Nevertheless, drone swarms—and autonomous weapons more
broadly—may be objects of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation
to the extent global and public norms form around the use of swarms and
autonomous weapons. Growing movements are seeking to ban autonomous
weapons due to concerns over risks to civilians and the ethics of abandoning
human control. Increasingly large constituencies support the movement, including
in some NATO member countries. For instance, 72 percent of Germans oppose
the use of autonomous weapons, according to a January 2019 Ipsos poll.29
Likewise, armed, fully autonomous swarms may pose psychological impacts and
risks akin to traditional weapons of mass destruction due to the combination of
mass casualty potential and the brittleness of current machine vision systems.30
The term “weapons of mass destruction” carries strong normative implications
with stigmas around their use and proliferation.31
Regardless of whether these public movements translate into changes in global
policy, they may create opportunities for strategic information operations to sow
division. For example, actors may amplify claims about the use of swarms and
autonomous weapons to encourage opposition to a war effort, both internally and
with partner nations. Conversely, actors may make false accusations against others
to achieve the same effects. The challenges of verifying whether an autonomous
weapon is truly autonomous make separating truth from fiction difficult.32
The autonomy of a drone swarm may be easier to prove because a person could
potentially control a small swarm consisting of dozens of drones, but no person
could reasonably control a few thousand drones. Disproving false claims about
autonomous drone-swarm use would be much harder.
28. Evan Ackerman, “This Autonomous Quadrotor Swarm Doesn’t Need GPS,” IEEE Spectrum (website),
December 27, 2017, https://spectrum.ieee.org/this-autonomous-quadrotor-swarm-doesnt-need-gps.
29. Chris Deeney, “Six in Ten (61%) Respondents across 26 Countries Oppose the Use of Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems,” Ipsos (website), January 22, 2019, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/human-rights
-watch-six-in-ten-oppose-autonomous-weapons.
30. Zachary Kallenborn, Are Drone Swarms Weapons of Mass Destruction?, Future Warfare Series no. 60
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies, 2020)
31. Patricia Shamai, “Name and Shame: Unraveling the Stigmatization of Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 1 (2015).
32. Zachary Kallenborn, “If a Killer Robot Were Used, Would We Know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(website), June 4, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/06/if-a-killer-robot-were-used-would-we-know/.

96

Parameters 52(2) Summer 2022

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Advances in AI and robotics underpin all aspects of drone swarms and affect
vulnerability and resilience to information warfare. Improvements in these
technologies may lead to better targeting algorithms, swarm task allocation
algorithms, and larger and more complex swarms and also affect electronic
warfare, cyberwarfare, and space warfare systems that may be used by or against
swarms. Greater use of AI and robotics on the battlefield may also create more
opportunities for psychological warfare.
Robotics and AI could improve offensive electronic warfare and cyberwarfare
capabilities. Machine learning could strengthen electronic warfare targeting and
create more effective and automated cyberattacks. For instance, machine learning
can enable better spectrum and power allocation, phishing detection, network
intrusion detection, and other activities.33 Indeed, China’s People’s Liberation
Army Strategic Support Force is reportedly integrating machine learning with
both cyberwarfare and electronic warfare.34 Additionally, advances in machine
learning could allow users to add better deep fakes to friendly or adversarial data
sets via cyber means.35 Researchers are also exploring the use of robots as platforms
for electronic attacks and cyberattacks.36
Advancements in AI are also likely to improve electronic, cyber, and space
countermeasures. Cyber defense techniques based on AI offer significant benefits
to cyber intrusion detection, including improved accuracy, automated response,
and throughput.37 Alternatively, robotic systems could be used to form an ad
hoc communications network where other systems are degraded or destroyed.
For example, Swarm Technologies’ SpaceBEE satellites form communication
networks for Internet-connected devices.38 Individual or multiple robots could
serve as intermediaries to support stable communication.

33. Vitaly Ford and Ambareen Siraj, “Applications of Machine Learning in Cyber Security”
(working paper, 27th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering,
New Orleans, LA, October 13–15, 2014), https://vford.me/papers/Ford%20Siraj%20Machine%20
Learning%20in%20Cyber%20Security%20final%20manuscript.pdf; and Yonghua Wang et al., “A Survey of
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation Based on Reinforcement Learning Algorithms in Cognitive Radio Networks,”
Artificial Intelligence Review 51, no. 3 (March 2019): 491–506.
34. Elsa B. Kania, “China’s Strategic Arsenals in a New Era,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (website),
April 20, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/chinas-strategic-arsenals-in-a-new-era/.
35. Tucker, “AI-Enabled Weapon.”
36. Polat Ceviket et al., “The Small and Silent Force Multiplier: A Swarm UAV—Electronic Attack,”
Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems 70, no. 1-4 (2013): 595–608.
37. Amjad Rehman and Tanzila Saba, “Evaluation of Artificial Intelligent Techniques to Secure Information
in Enterprises,” Artificial Intelligence Review 42, no. 4 (December 2014): 1029–44.
38. Marina Koren, “The Mystery of the ‘SpaceBees’ Just Got Even Weirder,” Atlantic (website),
May 17, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/rogue-satellites-launch-fcc/555482/.
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Robotic systems are great for space warfare; they do not need life-sustaining
equipment, which makes them less costly.39 Space-based robots could be used
to attack or collect information on adversarial satellites.40 Multiple space-based
robots could maneuver space debris into an orbit to hit adversary satellites or
mount distributed, coordinated attacks.41 Of course, a space-based swarm may have
different technological challenges than a terrestrial swarm—especially successful
movement and coordination.
More AI and robots on the battlefield means more opportunities to accuse
adversaries of violating nascent norms of autonomous weapons and, therefore,
more opportunities to wage psychological warfare. Improvements to AI might
counter some of this concern. One concern of activists is machine learning is
known to be brittle because training data may be biased or otherwise incomplete.
Enhanced testing and evaluation, synthetic data, and data sharing may reduce
the risks and provide opportunities for countermessaging. Judging how robust
machine learning systems are would be difficult, if not impossible, without closely
examining the training data. Adversaries may falsely claim the machine learning
systems are untested and poorly designed, leading to high risks to civilians, and
disproving such a claim would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus,
extensive deployment of these systems may lead to increased claims of violations
of the laws of war.

Policy Recommendations
The dependence of drone swarms on information warfare has several
implications the military should consider for successful operations.
More in-depth studies of the relationship between drone swarms and
information warfare are necessary and should explore the technical characteristics
of informational interactions, how the information environment shapes tactical
usage, and how tactical uses influence the operational and strategic environments.
Some studies could perform modeling and simulation to assess the resilience
of different drone-swarm configurations to informational attacks. Simulations
and war games could explore the relative value of drone swarms in specific
information-related roles (such as electronic attack) or as anti-satellite weapons.

39. Peter W. Singer, “Op-Ed: Wired for War: The Future of Military Robots,” Brookings Institution
(website), August 28, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/wired-for-war-the-future-of-military
-robots/.
40. Subrata Ghoshroy, “The X-37B: Backdoor Weaponization of Space?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71,
no. 3 (2015).
41. Marie Murphy, “70. Star Wars 2050,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command Mad Scientist
Laboratory (blog), July 23, 2018, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/70-star-wars-2050/.
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Analysis should focus on how the information competition changes in different
types of conflict (peer versus peer, peer versus near-peer, and asymmetric), the
resilience of different forms of communication to electronic attack and how drone
swarms fit into broader spectrum allocation, and new concepts incorporating
drone swarms and how they interact with information warfare.
Research and development of friendly drone swarms must include hardening
to informational attacks. Intraswarm communication channels, information
processing systems, and longer-range, command-and-control systems must
all be protected. Certain systems (such as object detection algorithms) will
not be specific to swarms. Some promising research on information hardening
has begun, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s work
on swarms that are operable in GNSS-denied environments.42 These projects
should be expanded. The degree to which a drone swarm is hardened should
depend on the mission and the likelihood and type of information-based attacks
the swarm may face.
The United States should also conduct a comprehensive review of
information warfare capabilities across each service. Indications point to
electronic-warfare challenges for the US Air Force and the US Army, though
not the US Navy.43 Major General John Morrison, commanding general of the
US Army Cyber Center of Excellence, bluntly stated, “When it comes to
electronic warfare, we are outgunned . . . We are plain outgunned by peer and
near-peer competitors.”44 Recent reports also paint a negative image of military
cybersecurity. An October 2018 Government Accountability Office report
“found that from 2012 to 2017, [Department of Defense] testers routinely found
mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems that were under
development.”45 Department of Defense difficulties in recruiting cyberwarriors
and a growing divide between Silicon Valley and the department exacerbate the
challenge.46 The United States faces increasing opposition in space, too. A recent
unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency report found the following.
42. Patrick Tucker, “The US Military’s Drone Swarm Strategy Just Passed a Key Test,” Defense One
(website), November 21, 2018, www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/11/us-militarys-drone-swarm
-strategy-just-passed-key-test/153007.
43. Mike Pietrucha, “Low-Altitude Penetration and Electronic Warfare: Stuck on Denial, Part III,” War
on the Rocks, April 25, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/low-altitude-penetration-stuck-on-denial
-part-iii/; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Tests Jamming MRAPs: New Electronic Warfare Vehicle,” Breaking
Defense, August 16, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-tests-jamming-mraps-new-electronic
-warfare-vehicle/; and Mark Pomerleau, “US Is ‘Outgunned’ in Electronic Warfare Says Cyber Commander,”
C4ISRNET (website), August 10, 2017, www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/technet-augusta/2017/08/10/us-is
-outgunned-in-electronic-warfare-says-cyber-commander/.
44. Pomerleau, “US Is ‘Outgunned.’ ”
45. Cristina T. Chaplain, Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of
Vulnerabilities, GAO-19-128 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, October 2018).
46. Amy Zegart and Kevin Childs, “The Divide between Silicon Valley and Washington Is a National
-Security Threat,” Atlantic (website), December 13, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12
/growing-gulf-between-silicon-valley-and-washington/577963/.
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Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they view space
as important to modern warfare and view counterspace capabilities
as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness . . . Both
have developed robust and capable space services, including spacebased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance . . . Both states
are developing jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy
weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based antisatellite missiles
that can achieve a range of reversible to nonreversible effects.47

The review should assess the true state of military information warfare and
its alignment with adversarial developments, identify concrete recommendations
to improve information warfare capabilities and organizations, and provide
an unclassified set of recommendations and guidance for the defense industry
and intelligentsia on how their efforts may support broader information
warfare activities.
According to the review results, the US military would be able to make
targeted investments in the study and development of offensive information
warfare capabilities (for example, electronic jamming and offensive cyberweapons)
to disrupt, manipulate, or otherwise defeat adversarial drone swarms that
may be used against American forces. Such investments would also benefit
other aspects of future warfare—from countering unmanned systems and
information-dependent warfare concepts to disrupting adversarial supply chains.
Relevant capabilities should be integrated organizationally, and developments
in robotics, electronic warfare, cyberwarfare, and space warfare should inform
drone swarm acquisition, research and development, war gaming, concept and
doctrine development, and related training. Activities should take place at the
Joint level to the extent possible because the drone-swarm information challenge
is the same for each service. Better integration across the components of the
information domain would also be useful for nonswarming, unmanned systems
because much of the analysis in this article also applies to them.
Intelligence collection on adversarial drone swarms and related information
warfare aspects would be important, too. Intelligence collection aimed at
drone-swarm technical operations would help the military understand how
to manipulate or disrupt adversarial drone swarms and identify opportunities
for covert action, such as poisoning data collections used for machine vision
algorithms.48 Other obvious targets for intelligence collections are adversarial
47. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence
Agency, 2019).
48. Matthew Jagielski et al., “Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures
for Regression Learning” (working paper, 2018 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Francisco, California, May 21–23, 2018), https://arxiv.org
/pdf/1804.00308.pdf.
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organizations that combine information warfare capabilities (for example, the
People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force). Information gathered
would help the military understand the capabilities potentially deployed against
American and strategic partner drone swarms.
Before deploying a drone swarm, future commanders should evaluate the
information warfare situation on the battlefield to inform the types of swarms
to be used and their composition. For instance, commanders could include
more communication drones to increase survivability. Training, exercises, and
war games should be created to help commanders develop and exercise this
judgment. In addition, incorporating information warfare elements into broader
readiness and training activities would allow commanders to appreciate the
challenges of losing control of the information environment. Commanders
could also consider the deployment of counterelectronic warfare weapons to
support the drone swarm in denied environments.
If the US military seeks to employ drone swarms in large numbers, it must
also plan for the mitigation of the resultant psychological warfare risks and
adopt measures to make these operations more transparent and to ensure
appropriate human control, provided the transparency does not deliver
advantages to adversaries. For example, the United States could adopt stronger
restrictions on autonomous weapons by turning current restrictions under
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, into
binding law or adopting new transparency policies on autonomous weapon
capabilities.49 These restrictions could be accompanied by costly commitments,
such as investment in verification measures for autonomous weapons.50

Conclusion
More than any other weapon system, drone swarms are dependent on
information. Virtually every swarm-related capability requires mastery of
information flows that let swarms grow in size, adopt complex behaviors,
and operate in multiple domains simultaneously. These advantages, however,
also pose a significant vulnerability. Disabling, disrupting, or manipulating
swarm communication, information processing, and geolocation can disable or
defeat a swarm.
No military technology exists in a vacuum. The military is a highly complex
system of systems, and numerous technological areas are interdependent.
49. “ICRC Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems,” International Committee of the Red Cross
(website), May 12, 2021, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems.
50. Matthew Mittelsteadt, AI Verification: Mechanisms to Ensure AI Arms Control Compliance
(Washington, DC: Center for Security and Emerging Technology, February 2021).
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Senior leaders must consider the role of new technologies within the broader
military ecosystem because myopia and failure are fast friends.
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